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Abstract
In recent years several countries have augmented their national tax laws by
transfer pricing legislations which intend to limit the leeway of multinational
firms to exploit international corporate tax rate differences and relocate profit
to low-tax affiliates by distorting intra-firm transfer prices. The aim of this
paper is to empirically investigate whether these laws are instrumental in
restricting shifting behaviour. To do so, we exploit unique information on the
scope and evolution of national transfer pricing laws and link it with panel data
on European multinationals. In line with previous studies, we find evidence
for tax-motivated profit shifting. The analysis further suggests that transfer
pricing rules significantly reduce shifting activities. The effect is economically
relevant, suggesting that the legislations may be socially desirable despite the
high administrative burden they impose on firms and tax authorities.
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1 Introduction
The economic literature has provided compelling evidence that multinational en-
tities (MNEs) strategically relocate income to low-tax affiliates in order to reduce
their overall tax bill (see e.g. Hines (1999) and Devereux and Maffini (2007)). Re-
cent studies moreover suggest that a major fraction of these shifting activities are
related to the strategic distortion of prices for intra-firm trade, especially in MNEs
with intangible property holdings (e.g. Clausing (2003), Grubert (2003)). To pre-
vent profit outflows through the manipulation of transfer prices, several countries
have recently augmented their tax laws by transfer pricing regulations. The scope
and design of these legislations differ substantially. Some countries only loosely
acknowledge that the price setting must adhere to the arm’s length principle (i.e.
intra-firm transfer prices must correspond to prices that would have been chosen by
unrelated parties), while others require corporations to submit detailed documen-
tion to the tax authorities in which they justify their corporate intra-firm prices and
hence the profit distribution across affiliates. Detected mispricing behavior and the
failure to provide adequate documentation moreover trigger non-negligible penalties
in many countries. A major drawback of (the stricter versions of the) transfer pric-
ing laws is that they entail considerable administrative costs for both, firms and tax
authorities. Their welfare consequences thus largely depend on their effectiveness in
limiting international income shifting activities.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that transfer pricing laws are rigorously applied.
In a number of prominent cases, tax authorities in the US, Canada and the UK
have challenged the transfer pricing of multinational companies like Astra Zeneca,
Daimler Chrysler and Motorola seeking billions of additional tax revenues (see e.g.
US Today (2004, 2006) and The Globe and Mail (2011)). In 2006, the US Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) announced that it had settled a transfer pricing dispute
with the pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline under which GlaxoSmithKline
payed $3.4 billion, making it the largest tax dispute in IRS history (see New York
Times (2006)). Nonsurprisingly, a large majority of MNEs thus perceive transfer
pricing as ”very important” or even consider it to be the ”most important tax
issue for their group” (Ernst and Young (2008)).1 Systematic empirical studies
which assess whether and to what extent transfer pricing legislations are effective
in limiting international profit shifting behavior are to the best of our knowledge
still missing though. The aim of our paper is to fill this gap. For that purpose, we
collected detailed information on the scope and evolution of transfer pricing laws in
26 European countries (see also Lohse et al. (2012)) and merged the data with rich
1The Ernst and Young survey suggests that 46%/76%/29% of MNEs headquartered in the
US/Germany/UK consider transfer pricing to be more important than any other tax issue.
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panel information on multinational firms and corporate tax legislations in Europe.
In a first step, we exploit the data to replicate existing evidence for multina-
tional profit shifting behaviour. The avoidance nature of income shifting implies
that MNEs try to hide related activities from the public and mispricing of intra-firm
trade is not directly observable to researchers. We thus follow previous studies and
indirectly test the shifting hypothesis by assessing whether corporate taxes reduce
the reported operating pre-tax profitability of multinational affiliates. Methodologi-
cally, we rely on panel estimations that control for unobserved affiliate heterogeneity
and for time-varying firm, industry and host-country characteristics. In line with
previous work, we find a negative correlation between the host country’s corporation
tax and firms’ pre-tax profitability. Quantitatively, an increase in the corporate tax
rate by 10 percentage points reduces the corporate pre-tax profitability by around
3.9% on average, while the sensitivity, in absolute terms, declines over time.
Using these estimates as a starting point, we, in a second step, assess the relation-
ship between tax-motivated income shifting and transfer pricing legislations. Our
baseline analysis divides countries into three categories depending on the existence
and scope of national transfer pricing laws: category 1 comprises countries without
transfer pricing legislations or with very general anti-avoidance rules only; category
2 comprises countries in which transfer pricing regulations do exist in practice and
where tax authorities may require some form of transfer price documentation; cat-
egory 3 comprises countries in which documentation requirements are introduced
into national tax law and imply that firms must provide transfer price documenta-
tion upon request or directly with the annual tax return. In robustness checks, we
additionally exploit information on specific transfer price penalties.
Our empirical analysis suggests that transfer pricing legislations significantly
reduce multinational income shifting as measured by the sensitivity of corporate
pre-tax profits to changes in the corporate tax rate. Relative to countries without
transfer pricing legislations, the implementation of transfer price documentation
regimes is found to reduce profit shifting behaviour by around 50% on average,
whereas stricter rules tend to induce stronger declines. On top, special transfer
pricing penalties are found to exert a limiting effect on shifting behaviour. The
qualitative and quantitative results are robust against a number of sensitivity checks.
We moreover augment our estimations by another characteristic feature of trans-
fer pricing regimes which is the possibility to enter into advance pricing agreements
(APA) where tax authorities and firms agree on future transfer prices for goods
traded within the firm on an upfront basis. APAs thus mainly serve as a device to
reduce corporate risk related to later transfer price adjustments. One may expect
that MNEs are willing to give up after-tax profits to buy this type of insurance
and accept more conservative transfer prices and, consequently, a reduction in tax
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savings. While we find some evidence in line with this hypothesis, the pattern does
not turn out to be stable across specifications.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the recent public finance literature.
First, we add to the large and growing literature on international profit shifting.
Similar to our approach, most papers provide indirect evidence on multinational
shifting behaviour by identifying a negative effect of host country corporate taxes
on the reported pre-tax profitability of affiliates (see e.g. Grubert and Mutti (1991),
Hines and Rice (1994), Huizinga and Laeven (2008), and Weichenrieder (2009)).
Some studies moreover assess the importance of individual income shifting channels.
Clausing (2003) provides evidence in favor of tax-motivated transfer price distortions
using data on intra-firm trade prices of US multinationals (see also Swenson (2001)
and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) for related studies). Several papers moreover
show that intangible assets play a prominent role in transfer pricing strategies as
their firm-specific nature implies that arm’s length prices from third-party trade are
commonly unavailable (see e.g. Grubert (1998), Grubert (2003), and Dischinger and
Riedel (2011)). Altshuler and Grubert (2003), Huizinga et al. (2008) and Buettner
and Wamser (2013) moreover determine the effect of corporate taxation on the
multinational’s debt-equity structure providing evidence in favour of tax-motivated
debt-shifting. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and Boehm et al. (2012) show that
multinationals strategically locate high-value patents in low-tax countries.
While profit shifting strategies are in general well-documented, the literature is
largely silent on the effectiveness of legislations which aim to limit international in-
come shifting. Exceptions are Buettner et al. (2012) and Ruf and Weichenrieder
(2012). Buettner et al. (2012) provide evidence that thin capitalization rules which
restrict the deductibility of interest payments from the corporate tax base indeed
limit multinational debt shifting behaviour. Similarly, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012)
report evidence that controlled foreign company regulations are effective in reduc-
ing the attractiveness of passive investments in low-tax jurisdictions. Our paper
complements these studies by showing that transfer pricing legislations reduce the
relocation of multinational income towards low-tax countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a simple the-
oretical model to motivate the set up of the empirical analysis. Sections 3 and 4
describe our data and estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the results and Section
6 concludes.
2 A Simple Theoretical Model
Consider a representative multinational group with two affiliates in countries a and b
that produce and sell an output si, with i ∈ {a, b}. Affiliate a additionally produces
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an input good that is required for production by both affiliates and is sold to affiliate
b at a transfer price q. For simplicity, the price of the final output good is normalized
to 1 and we abstract from any costs related to the production of the goods. The
affiliates’ pre-tax profits thus read pia = sa + q and pib = sb − q. Both countries levy
tax rates on corporate earnings denoted by ti, i ∈ {a, b}.
The MNE may shift income between the affiliates by choosing a transfer price q
which deviates from the input’s true value q¯. Price distortions incur positive costs
though as aggressive mispricing would, if challenged by the tax authorities, have
a lower probability of being sustained by courts or may require more resources to
defend successfully. Moreover, the structure of the costs plausibly depends on the
countries’ transfer pricing laws. The stricter the laws, the higher the probability that
mispricing is challenged which increases the concealment costs. Formally, we choose
a simple multiplicative formulation of the cost function: C = φ(γa, γb) · K(q − q¯),
where K(q− q¯) is assumed to be u-shaped in q, with a minimum at q¯: K(q = q¯) = 0,
sign Kq = sign(q − q¯) and Kqq > 0 (see e.g. Haufler and Schjelderup (2000)). The
function φ(γa, γb) captures how the scope of the countries’ transfer pricing laws γi
affects the level of transparency in price setting behaviour and the costs of profit
shifting. We assume φ ≥ 0 and φγi ≥ 0, i ∈ {a, b} (where φγi may differ across
countries, see the discussion below).2 The multiplicative structure implies that
tighter transfer pricing legislations increase the MNE’s absolute and marginal costs
to engage in mispricing behaviour.3
The MNE maximizes its after-tax profit
pi = (1− ta)(sa + q) + (1− tb)(sb − q)− C (1)
by choosing the optimal transfer price q. The first order condition is given by
tb − ta = φKq (2)
The optimal transfer pricing choice is thus determined by international differences
in corporate taxation. If ta > tb (ta < tb), the MNE chooses a transfer price q < q¯
(q > q¯) and thus relocates income from high-tax country A (B) to low-tax country
B (A) by underpricing (overpricing) the input good. Comparative statics read
dq
dta
= − dq
dtb
= − 1
φKqq
,
dq
dγi
= −φγiKq
φKqq
,
d2q
dtadγi
= − d
2q
dtbdγi
=
φγi
φ2Kqq
,
2(Double) subscripts denote first (second) derivatives with respect to the indicated variables.
3In practice, some of the types of costs noted above may be tax-deductible, while others are
not. For simplicity, it is assumed here that C is non-deductible. The results are not fundamentally
affected if the costs are deductible. However, taking account of deductibility adds considerable
complexity, as it is not entirely obvious in which country the costs would be incurred, and there
would be an incentive to shift these deductions from the low-tax to the high-tax country.
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with i ∈ {a, b}. Transfer price distortions are thus reduced if the scope of a
country’s transfer pricing laws, as modelled by the parameter γi, rise. Formally,
sign( dq
dγi
) = −signKq, dqdta = −
dq
dtb
< 0 and d
2q
dtadγi
= − d2q
dtbdγi
> 0. As a side remark,
note that φγi and hence the quantitative effect of transfer pricing laws on profit
shifting behaviour may differ across countries. Precisely, while the high-tax coun-
try benefits from less income shifting, the low-tax country loses in pre-tax profits
and tax revenues. Consequently, the latter has no incentive to implement transfer
pricing legislations in first place and, even if it has implemented them, authorities
will have no incentive to challenge tax-motivated mispricing behaviour. However,
transfer price documentation required by the low-tax country may nevertheless in-
crease transparency in price setting behaviour as the documentation results may
have to be shared with authorities in the high-tax countries, e.g. in the course of
court disputes. Consequently, it plausibly holds that 0 ≤ φγi < φγj , with ti < tj,
i, j ∈ {a, b}, i 6= j.
As the price q impacts on the affiliates’ pre-tax profits, it furthermore follows
dpii
dti
= − 1
φKqq
< 0, i, j ∈ {a, b} (3)
d2pii
dtidγi
=
φγi
φ2Kqq
> 0, i, j ∈ {a, b} (4)
Our empirical analysis will test the link between multinational profit shifting and
the scope of transfer pricing legislations. As information on intra-firm transfer prices
is unavailable in firm-level databases, we follow the previous literature and assess
the profit shifting hypothesis by testing if the corporate tax rate reduces multina-
tional pre-tax profits as spelled out in Equation (3). In line with Equation (4), we
furthermore assess whether this sensitivity is reduced when the scope of transfer
pricing legislations increases.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis links firm-level information on multinational affiliates in Eu-
rope with detailed data on the host countries’ corporate taxation system.
Firm Data
The firm information is taken from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database (version
February 2011). The data comprises panel information on corporate balance sheets
and profit & loss accounts for firms in 26 European countries between 1999 and
2009. The firms included in our analysis belong to multinational groups in the sense
that either their parent company or one of their wholly owned subsidiaries is located
in a foreign economy. The observational unit of the analysis is the multinational
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affiliate per year. In total, our sample comprises 151,716 observations from 32,508
affiliates for the years 1999 to 2009. Hence, we observe each affiliate for 4.7 years
on average. A country distribution of the affiliates is presented in Table 1.4
Corporate Tax Rates and Transfer Price Legislations
We furthermore augment our firm level data by information on statutory corporate
tax rates and the scope and evolution of transfer pricing laws in our European sample
countries. The corporate tax data was obtained from Ernst & Young’s worldwide
corporate tax guide. Information on transfer pricing regulations was collected from
various sources, in particular from the transfer pricing guides published by Deloitte,
Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PwC (see Lohse et al., 2012).
Transfer pricing regulations vary across countries and differ in a number of charac-
teristics. One challenge of the analysis is thus to develop a quantitative measure for
the scope and evolution of a country’s transfer pricing laws. Our baseline analysis
classifies countries in three categories.
The first category comprises countries without or with very limited transfer price
legislations. During our sample period, most European countries had implemented
the arm’s length principle in their national tax law.5 Especially in early years,
legislations were often imprecise though and did not include further details on the
applicability of the law, the determination of transfer prices, and the required trans-
fer price documentation. As the legislations lacked the scope to restrict transfer
pricing behaviour, we assign the according country-year-cells to the first category.
Categories 2 and 3 comprise countries in periods with more comprehensive transfer
pricing regulations, especially concerning the required transfer price documentation
which is the main regulatory instrument to increase the transparency of price choices
and reduce corporate mispricing behavior. The second category comprises countries
where formal transfer pricing legislations are still weak but transfer price documen-
tation is nevertheless regularly required in practice in the case of formal audits by
the tax authorities. Countries in the third category, in turn, explicitly introduced
transfer price documentation requirements into their national tax law and specified
that documentation must either be available upon request or has to be handed in
directly with the firm’s annual tax return.6 See Table 2A for a categorisation of all
country-year-cells in our data. The table conveys that transfer pricing regulations
4The firm distribution broadly corresponds to the distribution of economic activity across our
sample countries. As Bureau von Dijk collects data from different information sources, the precise
sample coverage varies across countries though and thus some caution is warranted when drawing
conclusions from our results for the population of firms.
5The arm’s length principle requires prices for intracompany transactions to correspond to the
price that would have been chosen by unrelated parties.
6Note that in most cases the burden of proof with respect to the appropriateness of a transfer
price moreover switches from the tax authorities to the taxpayer if no or only insufficient docu-
mentation is provided.
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have been introduced or tightened during our sample period in all European coun-
tries. While in 1999, the majority of countries is assigned to Categories 1 and 2, by
2009, the majority has moved up to Category 3.
Complementary to this measure, we define a variable for the country’s enforcement
of transfer pricing regulations. Besides penalties for the wrong determination of
taxable income, regulations may include penalties for wrong, missing or incomplete
transfer price documentation. Most countries apply general tax penalties to the
mispricing of intra-firm trade (i.e. the underreporting of income). Some countries
additionally introduced special transfer pricing penalties, mainly concerning non-
compliance with transfer price documentation laws. General as well as specific
transfer price legislations commonly offer a wide range of penalties, which depend on
the particularity of the specific case, so that a quantification and concise comparison
across countries is impossible to implement (see Lohse et al. (2012)). For the analysis
to come, we thus revert to defining a dummy variable which indicates whether
a country has implemented specific transfer pricing penalties. Specific penalties
suggest that authorities pay particular attention to the transfer pricing sphere which
is in turn expected to increase compliance with the transfer price (documentation)
laws. See Table 2B for a classification of our sample countries.
The analysis furthermore exploits information on so-called advance pricing agree-
ments (APAs). APAs allow tax payers and tax authorities to negotiate a transfer
price for a certain transaction and pre-determined time period in advance. From
the tax payer’s perspective, any risk related to possible transfer price adjustments
in later audits is thus eliminated. APAs can be structured as unilateral or bilateral
agreement. A unilateral agreement is entered by the taxpayer and the national tax
authority of the hosting country, while a bilateral agreement also includes the tax
authority of the foreign country which is affected by the transaction. Bilateral agree-
ments are thus much more favourable for taxpayers as transfer prices are approved
by both affected countries. In the following, we define a dummy variable indicating
whether the tax authorities in the firm’s host country offer bilateral APAs. In 1999,
none of our sample countries applied APAs. By 2009, ten countries had started
offering bilateral APA procedures (see Table 2C for details).
Transfer price documentation rules commonly also specify methods for the calcu-
lation of arm’s length prices for intrafirm trade. In most cases, the rules follow the
OECD transfer pricing guidelines which allow various methods, e.g. the calculation
of arm’s length prices referring to prices, profit margins or profit splits of comparable
uncontrolled transactions. As there is little variation in the allowed methods across
countries and different methods do not systematically imply more or less leeway in
the transfer pricing choice, the analysis to come will abstract from this aspect.7
7The detection risk of transfer price distortions may also differ across asset types. For instance,
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Finally note that, in line with our brief discussion in Section 2, the scope of a
country’s transfer price legislations tends to be correlated with its corporate tax
rate. While, by the end of our sample period, many high-tax countries required
transfer price documentation and charged specific transfer pricing penalties, tax
haven economies like Ireland had not implemented according legislations.
Country Control Variables
We moreover augment our data by various other host country characteristics, in-
cluding GDP as a proxy for the country’s market size, GDP per capita as a proxy for
a country’s income and development level, the GDP growth rate and unemployment
rate as a proxy for the state of a country’s economy and the corruption index as a
proxy for the state of a country’s governance institutions. The corruption index is
obtained from Transparency International. All other country data is retrieved from
the World Development Indicator Database. See Table 3 for descriptive statistics.
4 Estimation Strategy
As described in Section 2, the aim of our analysis is to determine the impact of trans-
fer pricing laws on multinational profit shifting behaviour. To test the hypotheses
derived in Section 2, we estimate a model of the following form
ln EBITit = β0 + β1τit + β2(τit · TPit) + β3TPit + β4Xit + ρt + φi + it (5)
where ln EBITit stands for the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and
tax of affiliate i at time t. We thus follow earlier research (e.g. Huizinga and Laeven,
2008) and limit the sample to affiliates with positive operating pre-tax profits, for
which profit-shifting incentives are most likely to be relevant. As sketched in Section
2, we test for profit shifting behaviour by assessing the hypothesis that the host
country’s corporate tax rate τit exerts a negative impact on the affiliate’s reported
profits as measured by EBIT (see Equation (3) in Section 2).8 The theoretical model
further predicts that this sensitivity is reduced when the affiliate’s host country
introduces or tightens transfer pricing legislations TPit (see Equation (4) in Section
2). The model accounts for this by including an interaction term between the
corporate tax rate τit and the scope of the country’s transfer pricing laws TPit.
We expect β1 < 0 and β2 > 0. The ratio between the absolute coefficients (0 ≤
β2/|β1| ≤ 1) provides an indicator for the fraction of income shifting activities which
transfer prices for firm-specific intangible assets are more difficult to assess and offer a greater scope
for manipulation than tangible assets. This difference, however, is not specific to any particular
country and is consequently not reflected in the construction of our transfer pricing variables.
8 We furthermore run robustness checks which replace the tax regressor by the corporate tax
rate difference to other affiliates in the same multinational group (see Section 5 for details).
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is eliminated by the introduction or tightening of transfer pricing legislations.
We furthermore expect a negative or zero coefficient estimate β3 for the transfer
pricing variable TPit which captures the effect of stricter transfer price legislations
on EBIT in countries with a zero corporate tax rate. As tax havens are at the
receiving end of profit shifting activities, the introduction or tightening of transfer
price documentation requirements is presumed to (weakly) reduce inward shifting
and reported EBIT (see our discussion in Section 2).9
The estimation model moreover includes a full set of affiliate fixed effects to absorb
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity across entities. We further augment the set
of regressors by time-varying control variables Xit, comprising firm characteristics
(the fixed asset stock and the costs for employees of affiliate i at time t) as well as host
country controls (GDP, GDP per capita, the GDP growth rate, the unemployment
rate and the TPI corruption index in the affiliate’s host country). All specifications
furthermore include a full set of one-digit industry-year fixed effects which absorb
common shocks to all affiliates within the same industry over time.
5 Results
The baseline results are presented in Table 4. Heteroscedasticity robust standard
errors which account for clustering at the firm level (column (a)), the country-year
level (column (b)) and the industry level (column (c)) are reported in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates.10 In Specification (1), we regress the logarithm of
EBIT on the statutory corporate tax rate and the full set of control variables speci-
fied in Section 4. In line with previous studies, we find a negative coefficient estimate
for the corporate tax variable, providing indirect evidence for multinational profit
shifting. The coefficient estimate remains statistically significant at conventional
significance levels when standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm or
industry level. Quantitatively, the results suggest that an increase of the corporate
tax rate by 10 percentage points decreases reported pre-tax profits by 3.94%. Spec-
ification (2) augments the set of regressors by an interaction term between the host
country’s corporate tax and a linear time trend, thus allowing the scope of profit
shifting activities to change over time. The coefficient estimates for the corporate
tax variable and the interaction term turn out significantly negative and positive re-
spectively. The latter indicates that the sensitivity of operating profits to corporate
9In specifications where τit is modelled by the corporate tax rate difference to other affiliates
within the same multinational group (see footnote 8), the coefficient estimate β3 is expected to be
weakly negative (positive) if affiliates whose host country corporate tax rate corresponds to the
average corporate tax rate of other affiliates within the multinational group are at the receiving
(sending) end of tax-motivated income shifting strategies.
10As our sample comprises 26 countries only, there are not enough clusters for reliable inference
when standard errors are adjusted for clusters at the country level.
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tax rates decreased by 0.18 annually during our sample period.
Specification (3) additionally accounts for transfer pricing legislations in the af-
filiates’ host countries by including a dummy variable which indicates whether a
country requires some form of transfer price documentation (corresponding to Cat-
egories 2 and 3 defined in Section 3) and its interaction with the corporate tax rate.
The coefficient estimate for the interaction term between the corporate tax rate
and the transfer price documentation dummy turns out positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that documentation rules are instrumental in limiting income
shifting activities. Evaluated at the tax elasticity for 1999, the results imply that
shifting activities are reduced by around 50% (= 1.709/(−3.425)). As expected,
the coefficient estimate for the transfer pricing variable is negative, indicating that
implementing transfer price documentation rules in countries with a zero tax rate
reduces inward shifting and operating profits.11 All results are robust to adjusting
standard errors for clusters at the firm, industry or country-year level.
Specification (1) of Table 5 reassesses the relationship between transfer pricing
laws and profit shifting behaviour by modelling the scope of a country’s transfer pric-
ing legislations by the three categories described in Section 3.12 The results resemble
our baseline findings. Again, operating profits are found to respond negatively to
corporate tax incentives and the sensitivity is significantly reduced by documenta-
tion requirements. Specification (2) models the transfer price system by including
separate indicators for Categories 2 and 3 and their interactions with the corporate
tax variable. In line with the previous estimates, we find that, evaluated at the tax
sensitivity of operating profits in 1999, moving from Category 1 to Category 2 (Cat-
egory 1 to Category 3) reduces profit shifting by around 61% (= 1.789/(−2.942))
(85% (= 2.494/(−2.942))). Specifications (4) to (6) reestimate the models employing
EBIT over total assets as corporate profitability measure which leaves the pattern of
the results unaltered, although the quantitative effects turn out somewhat smaller.
Specification (6) suggests that moving from Category 1 to Category 2 (Category 1
to Category 3) limits income shifting by 35% (53%). Moreover, in line with the con-
siderations of Section 2, the introduction and tightening of transfer price legislations
significantly reduces the operating profitability of low-tax affiliates. If Ireland, which
was the sample country with the lowest corporate tax rate during our sample period
(=10%), had introduced transfer price documentation requirements of Category 2
11Note that the control variables show the expected signs. Fixed asset investment and the sum of
the costs of employees exert a positive impact on reported EBIT. The coefficient estimate for GDP
per capita is equally positive, indicating that profits increase with general economic development.
A positive (negative) coefficient estimate for the GDP growth (unemployment) variable points to
procyclicality of profits over the business cycle. The negative coefficient estimate for the GDP
variable may suggest that competition is more intense in larger markets which drives down profits.
12Precisely, we define a variable which takes on the values 1,2,3 for country-year cells in Cate-
gories 1,2,3 defined in Section 3.
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or 3, the model predicts that the operating profitability of Irish affiliates would have
been reduced by 10.5%(= −0.23 + 0.10 · 1.25) and 28.3% (= −0.47 + 0.10 · 1.89)
respectively (see Specification (6)).13
The baseline specification employs EBIT - and thus operating profits - as the cor-
porate profitability measure. This reflects that transfer price distortions for goods
and services traded within the group first and foremost affect a company’s oper-
ating income. However, financial profits may also be affected by transfer pricing
regulations as they require interest rates for intra-group lending to be set according
to the arm’s length principle. We thus rerun our baseline model using corporate
pre-tax profits as the dependent variable which comprises operating and financial
income. The results are presented in Table 6. Specifications (1) to (3) ((4) to (6))
use pre-tax profits (pre-tax profits over total assets) as the dependent variable. We
find a strong negative effect of corporate taxes on pre-tax profits (comparable in
size to the baseline specifications), which indicates that MNEs relocate financial
(and operating) income in response to international tax rate differentials. There
are two channels through which financial income can be shifted: first, MNEs may
distort the affiliates’ debt-equity structure by injecting equity into low-tax affiliates
which then lend to high-tax affiliates and thus strip the associated interest income
from the high-tax economy; second, MNEs may distort interest rates on intra-group
lending activities as mentioned above. Transfer price documentation requirements
may impose restrictions on the second channel, but are not instrumental in cap-
ping distortions of the debt-equity structure.14 Arm’s length prices for financial
transactions are moreover readily available in many instances, implying that shift-
ing opportunities are limited even in the absence of documentation requirements.
Taken together, we expect transfer price legislations to be less effective in curtailing
the shifting of financial income relative to operating income. This is confirmed by
the estimation analysis. The negative effect of transfer pricing legislations on profit
shifting behavior is smaller than in the baseline specifications. Column (3) suggests
that, evaluated at the tax sensitivity of 1999, moving from a transfer price regime
of Category 1 to Category 2 (Category 3) reduces the profit sensitivity to corporate
tax rate changes by around 38% (63%). Using pre-tax profits over total assets as
dependent variable, Column (6) reports that the profit sensitivity to corporate tax
rate choices shrinks by 19% (39%).
As described in Section 3, we furthermore augment our data by information on
bilateral APAs which eliminate the firms’ risk for later transfer price adjustments in
13In line with the notion that low-tax countries lack incentives to implement transfer price doc-
umentation requirements, Ireland’s transfer pricing policy corresponds to Category 1 throughout
the sample period though (see Section 3).
14Several countries have enacted so-called thin-capitalisation rules to limit distortions in affiliates’
debt-equity structures. See our discussion below.
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the course of tax audits. Multinational corporations might thus be willing to give up
after-tax income to buy this type of insurance and agree on less aggressive transfer
prices. In the context of our estimation model this implies that the possibility to
enter into bilateral APAs is expected to reduce the sensitivity of reported operating
profits to corporate tax rate changes. To assess this hypothesis, we augment our
baseline model by an indicator variable whether a firm’s host country offers bilateral
APA procedures and an interaction term between the APA variable and the corpo-
rate tax rate. The results can be found in Table 7. In line with the above presump-
tion, we find a positive coefficient estimate for the interaction between APAs and
the corporation tax in the baseline specification in Column (1). The estimate does
not turn out to be robust against using alternative corporate profitability measures
and alternative definitions of the transfer price documentation variable though (see
specifications (2) to (4)), suggesting that APAs do no induce a systematic reduction
in tax-motivated price distortions. Note that the negative effect of transfer price
documentation laws on profit shifting behaviour prevails in all model specifications.
So far, our empirical analysis followed the theoretical predictions of Equations (3)
and (4) and assessed multinational profit shifting behaviour by testing for a negative
effect of the host country’s corporate tax rate on affiliate pre-tax profitability. The-
ory suggests that the affiliates’ pre-tax profitability is also determined by corporate
taxes at other group affiliates, more precisely, by the corporate tax rate difference be-
tween the entities ( dpii
d(ti−tj) = − 1φKqq < 0, d
2pii
d(ti−tj)dγ =
φγi
φ2Kqq
> 0, i, j ∈ {a, b} , i 6= j).
We thus reassess the profit shifting hypothesis by testing for a negative effect of the
affiliates’ corporate tax rate difference to all other majority-owned entities within
the multinational group (calculated as an unweighted average15) on reported oper-
ating profitability. The results are shown in Table 8. Specification (1) reestimates
the baseline model in Column (3) of Table 4. In line with expectations, we find a
negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the tax difference vari-
able. The coefficient estimate for the interaction between the corporate tax rate and
the transfer price documentation dummy turns out positive and statistically signifi-
cant, again suggesting that the income shifting effect is significantly reduced by the
introduction of transfer price documentation rules. Quantitatively, the findings im-
ply a decline by around 74%.16 This pattern prevails when we model transfer price
15For subsidiaries, the group structure was determined by identifying the global ultimate owner
and all its majority-owned subsidiaries. If information on the global ultimate owner was not
available, the immediate shareholder was used. If the immediate shareholder was also not available,
we restricted the view to the majority-owned subsidiaries of the firm itself. For parent firms, the
group structure was determined by accounting for all majority-owned subsidiary firms. Further
note that we refrain from calculating size-weighted average corporate tax rates, as AMADEUS
comprises subsidiary lists on a worldwide basis but often does not report reliable size information
for affiliates outside Europe.
16Note that the coefficient for the transfer pricing variable turns out positive (while it was
negative in the baseline model), reflecting that the introduction of transfer pricing legislations
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legislations by including dummy variables for transfer pricing regimes of Categories
2 and 3 in Specification (2) and augment the specification by information on APAs
and their interaction term with the corporate tax rate in Specification (3). Again,
APAs are not found to significantly affect shifting behavior. The results are further
confirmed when we reestimate the specifications, employing EBIT over total assets
as the dependent variable (see Specifications (4) to (6)). Quantitatively, Specifica-
tion (6) suggests that implementing transfer price documentation rules into national
tax law (Category 3) reduces shifting activities by 76% relative to scenarios without
documentation requirements (Category 1).
Moreover, we augmented the baseline information on the existence and scope of
a country’s transfer price documentation requirements by data for specific penalties
related to the transfer pricing sphere. As described above, the latter may indi-
cate a particular attention and commitment of a country’s authorities to punish
mispricing behavior and may thus additionally deter profit shifting activities. Spec-
ifications (1) and (2) of Table 9 reestimate the baseline model using EBIT and
EBIT over total assets as dependent variable and augment the set of regressors by
a dummy variable for the existence of specific transfer price penalties and its inter-
action with the corporate tax variable. While the baseline findings are confirmed in
the sense that transfer price documentation requirements reduce the tax sensitivity
of operating profits, we also find a positive and significant coefficient estimate for
the interaction between the corporate tax rate and the penalty variable, indicating
that beyond effects related to transfer price documentation rules, the introduction
of specific transfer pricing penalties is instrumental in reducing shifting behavior.
Quantitatively, the model in Column (2) suggests that implementing transfer price
documentation laws reduces shifting behaviour by around 62%, while implement-
ing special transfer pricing penalties leads to a reduction in shifting behaviour by
another 14%.17 Specification (3) shows that the result is robust to modelling the
transfer price legislations by the three categories defined in Section 3. Specifications
(4) and (5) furthermore reestimate the models in Columns (2) and (3) using the tax
difference measure instead of the statutory tax rate as the corporate tax variable.
Again, the pattern of the results remains unaltered.
One may still have concerns that our results (partly) reflect effects related to
anti-profit shifting measures other than transfer price legislations. In particular,
countries may simultaneously enact or tighten several anti-shifting policies, in par-
ticular thin-capitalisation rules and controlled foreign company legislations (CFC).
Debt-shifting and thin-capitalisation rules, however, affect affiliates’ financial profits
exerts a positive impact on reported EBIT for affiliates whose host country corporate tax is equal
to the average corporate tax rate of other affiliates in the multinational group.
17The coefficient estimate for the penalty variable is negative, indicating that the introduction
of transfer price penalties reduces shifting towards countries with a zero corporate tax rate.
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only, while our baseline analysis employs EBIT as the dependent variable and thus
tests for variation in the affiliates’ operating income in response to changes in trans-
fer price documentation requirements (which excludes financial income). Even if the
introduction and scope of thin-capitalisation rules and transfer pricing legislations
were correlated, the results would thus not be confounded. Moreover, CFC legis-
lations reduce income relocations from the group’s headquarters country by means
of passive investments in low-tax countries. One major source of passive income
are lending activities that earn interest income in low-tax affiliates. As our baseline
analysis abstracts from financial income, effects related to such activities can again
not confound the results. Another source of passive income which affects the op-
erating profit measure though are royalty and license fees from intangible property
holdings. We thus reestimate our model, controlling for CFC legislations by includ-
ing a dummy variable indicating whether an affiliate is affected by CFC legislations
and the interaction term of this variable with the host country’s corporate tax rate.18
The results are presented in Table 10 and qualitatively and quantitatively resemble
our baseline findings.
Concluding, our analysis presents evidence that transfer price documentation re-
quirements and special transfer pricing penalties are instrumental in reducing inter-
national profit shifting behaviour. The effect turns out to be quantitatively relevant,
suggesting that income shifting activities are reduced by around 50%, with stricter
legislations inducing stronger declines. A concise cost-benefit analysis of the policy
goes beyond the scope of our paper as it required detailed information on com-
pliance costs of multinational corporations related to transfer price documentation
and resource costs of transfer pricing departments in national tax authorities. Both
informations are, to the best of our knowledge, not publicly available. Moreover,
in evaluating the welfare consequences of transfer price documentation policies, one
has to keep in mind that the welfare effects of multinational profit shifting behaviour
are still debated in the academic literature. While many papers stress the adverse
consequences of shifting activities related to revenue losses in high-tax countries and
detrimental international tax competition between governments for the mobile tax
base, a number of recent studies also claim that the ability to relocate income may
foster real investment activity of MNEs in high-tax countries and increase welfare
(see e.g. Hong and Smart (2010)).
18The dummy is coded 1 if the considered firm is the parent of a multinational group (or a
subsidiary located in the parent country) and CFC legislations are enacted in its home country or if
the considered firm is a subsidiary of a multinational group whose parent country has enacted CFC
legislations which are binding with respect to the subsidiary’s host country (i.e. the subsidiary’s
host country is considered to be a tax haven by the home country’s CFC legislations).
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6 Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess the impact of transfer price documentation laws
on international profit shifting behaviour. Profit shifting activities related to the
mispricing of intra-firm trade have been well documented in the academic literature
and are widely perceived to belong to the most important strategies which allow
multinational firms to relocate income to low-tax affiliates (see e.g. Clausing (2003)).
In many countries, policy makers have raised increasing concerns about the implied
corporate tax base losses (see e.g. Heinemann and Janeba (2011)) and implemented
transfer pricing documentation requirements in their national tax laws with the
purpose to increase transparency in price setting behaviour and reduce the scope
for tax favourable transfer price distortions.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically assess whether
these rules are instrumental in reducing multinational income shifting behaviour.
For that purpose, we collected information on transfer price legislations in 26 Euro-
pean countries over the past decade and linked it with panel data on multinational
firms in Europe. Our findings suggest that multinational profit shifting activities
are significantly reduced when countries introduce or tighten transfer price docu-
mentation requirements. Depending on the model specification, the results indicate
a reduction by around 50%, with stricter rules inducing stronger declines in shifting
behavior. Specific transfer pricing penalties exert an additional dampening effect on
income shifting behaviour. The strong decline in tax-motivated international profit
shifting activities suggest that transfer pricing laws may exert positive welfare effects
despite the high administrative burden they impose on firms and tax authorities. A
thorough welfare analysis is a fruitful avenue for future research.
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8 Appendix
Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Firm Number
Austria 300
Belgium 2,187
Bulgaria 633
Croatia 365
Czech Republic 551
Denmark 1,771
Estonia 282
Finland 544
France 3,001
Germany 1,510
Hungary 34
Ireland 33
Italy 2,348
Latvia 8
Luxembourg 18
Netherlands 2,196
Norway 1,101
Poland 934
Portugal 337
Romania 4,735
Slovak Republic 78
Spain 2,803
Sweden 2,127
Switzerland 136
Ukraine 133
United Kingdom 4,343
Sum 32,508
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Table 2A: Transfer Price Documentation Requirements
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Austria . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . 2
Croatia 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . 3
Czech Republic . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Denmark . . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Estonia . . . . . . . . 3 3 3
Finland . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
France . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany . . 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Hungary . . 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Italy . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Latvia . . . . . . . . 2 2 2
Luxembourg . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2
Netherlands 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Norway . . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 3
Poland . . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Portugal 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Romania . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Slovak Republic . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 3
Spain . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Sweden . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Switzerland . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
United Kingdom 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes: The table indicates the existence and scope of national transfer price documentation requirements. Category
1 comprises countries without or with very limited transfer price legislations. Category 2 indicates countries where
formal transfer pricing legislations are still weak but transfer price documentation is nevertheless regularly required
in practice. Category 3 comprises countries which explicitly introduced transfer price documentation requirements
into their national tax law and specified that documentation must either be available upon request or has to be
handed in directly with the firm’s annual tax return. ’.’ indicates that we were unable to obtain concise information
on the transfer price documentation requirements.
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Table 2B: Specific Transfer Pricing Penalties
1 height 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Germany 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: The table indicates whether a country does (= 1) or does not (= 0) levy specific penalties related to the
transfer pricing sphere.
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Table 2C: Possibility to enter into a bilateral advance pricing agreement
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . .
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table indicates whether a country’s tax authorities do (= 1) or do not (= 0) offer bilateral advanced
pricing agreements. ’.’ indicates that we were unable to obtain concise information.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Earnings Before Interest 150,214 17,086.5 255,592.8 0.0011 3.54e+07
and Taxes (EBIT)F
Pre-tax ProfitsF 151,716 21,565.42 272,660 0.0004 3.45e+07
Earnings Before Interest and 150,214 0.1277 0.2075 1.41e-06 22.9051
Taxes over Total AssetsF
Pre-tax Profits over 151,716 0.1380 2.0007 1.62e-06 764.946
Total AssetsF
Fixed AssetsF 151,716 181,206.8 2,207,504 0.0014 2.36e+08
Costs of EmployeesF 151,716 27,373.47 222,174.1 0.0003 2.26e+07
Corporate Tax Rate 151,716 0.3019 0.0627 0.1 0.4025
Tax DifferentialH 87,152 0.0097 0.0626 -0.303 0.314
TP Legislation Binary 151,716 0.9596 0.1970 0 1
TP Legislation Continuous 151,716 2.3863 0.5639 1 3
Category 1 151,716 0.0404 0.1970 0 1
Category 2 151,716 0.5329 0.4989 0 1
Category 3 151,716 0.4267 0.4946 0 1
APA 146,321 0.5243 0.4994 0 1
GDP per CapitaN 151,716 20,688.4 9,660.09 594 56,600
GDPN 151,716 7.40e+11 6.42e+11 8.19e+09 2.1e+12
GDP growth rate 151,716 2.1978 3.0162 -18 12.1
Corruption Index 151,716 6.9147 1.9872 1.5 9.7
Unemployment 151,716 7.3699 2.9651 2.1 20.5
Notes:
Firm data is exported from the AMADEUS database offered by Bureau van Dijk, version: February 2011. ’TP
Legislation Binary’ describes an indicator variable for the existence of transfer pricing legislation in the affiliate’s
host country, ’TP Legislation Continuous’ depicts the scope of a country’s transfer pricing legislation, taking on
the value 1/2/3 if a country’s transfer price regime is classified in Categories 1/2/3 as defined in Section 3. ’APA’
stands for an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if a country offers bilateral advanced pricing procedures.
F taken from unconsolidated accounts, in thousand USD
H difference between the host country’s corporate tax rate and the unweighted average tax rate of other major
affiliates in the corporate group (ownership >50%)
N in USD, constant prices, year 2000 (Source: World Development Indicator Database, World Bank)
 in % (Source: World Development Indicator Database, World Bank)
 index ranges from 1 (high level of corruption) to 10 (no corruption) (Source: Transparency International)
 in % of total labor force (Source: World Development Indicator Database, World Bank)
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Table 5: Alternative Definitions of Firm Profitability and Transfer Pricing Variable
Dependent Variable: Log EBIT (Columns (1)-(2)), Log EBIT/Total Assets (Columns (3)-(5))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corporate Tax Rate -3.339∗∗∗ -2.942∗∗∗ -4.018∗∗∗ -4.246∗∗∗ -3.560∗∗∗
(0.377) (0.412) (0.397) (0.359) (0.400)
TP Leg. Binary × Corp. Tax Rate 1.155∗∗∗
(0.354)
TP Legislation Binary -0.219∗
(0.121)
TP Leg. Cont. × Corp. Tax Rate 1.058∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.138)
TP Legislation Continuous -0.327∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.044)
Category 2 × Corporate Tax Rate 1.789∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.357)
Category 3 × Corporate Tax Rate 2.494∗∗∗ 1.886∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.383)
Category 2 -0.478∗∗∗ -0.230∗
(0.124) (0.121)
Category 3 -0.737∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.131)
Corporate Tax Rate × Time 0.069∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
Firm and Country Controls
√ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year-Effects
√ √ √ √ √
#Observations 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214
Within R-Squared 0.1580 0.1582 0.0341 0.0341 0.0345
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observational unit is the multinational firm per year. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the firm’s EBIT (Columns (1) and (2)) and EBIT over total assets (Columns (3) to
(5)) respectively. See the notes to Table 4 for a definition of the regressors. On top, ’TP Legislation Continuous’
depicts the scope of a country’s transfer pricing legislation (see Section 3 for details) and ’TP Legislation Continuous
x Corporate Tax Rate’ its interaction term with the corporate tax rate. ’Category 2’ and ’Category 3’ depict indicator
variables for transfer pricing regimes of Categories 2 and 3 as defined in Section 3. ’Category 2 x Corporate Tax
Rate’ and ’Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate’ describe the respective interaction terms with the corporate tax rate.
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Table 6: Alternative Definitions of Firm Profitability and Transfer Pricing Variable
Dependent Variable: Log Profit Before Taxes (Columns (1)-(3)), Log Profit Before Taxes/Total Assets (Columns (4)-(6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corporate Tax Rate -4.464∗∗∗ -4.705∗∗∗ -3.788∗∗∗ -5.104∗∗∗ -5.760∗∗∗ -4.430∗∗∗
(0.448) (0.410) (0.451) (0.436) (0.395) (0.440)
TP Leg. Binary × Corp. Tax Rate 1.252∗∗ 0.628
(0.405) (0.398)
TP Legislation Binary -0.355∗∗ -0.079
(0.139) (0.137)
TP Leg. Cont. × Corp. Tax Rate 1.186∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.151)
TP Legislation Continuous -0.405∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.048)
Category 2 × Corp. Tax Rate 1.451∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗
(0.409) (0.401)
Category 3 × Corp. Tax Rate 2.370∗∗∗ 1.741∗∗∗
(0.437) (0.426)
Category 2 -0.376∗∗∗ -0.101
(0.139) (0.137)
Category 3 -0.744∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗
(0.149) (0.146)
Corp. Tax Rate × Time 0.354∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039)
Firm and Country Controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year-Effects
√ √ √ √ √ √
#Observations 151,716 151,716 151,716 151,716 151,716 151,716
Within R-Squared 0.1425 0.1431 0.1432 0.0326 0.0330 0.0334
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observational unit is the multinational firm per year. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the firm’s pre-tax profits (Columns (1) and (3)) and pre-tax profits over total assets
(Columns (4) to (6)) respectively. See the notes to Tables 4 and 5 for a definition of the regressors.
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Table 7: Advanced Pricing Agreements
Dependent Variable: Log EBIT (Columns (1)-(2)), Log EBIT/Total Assets (Columns (3)-(4))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corporate Tax Rate -2.438∗∗∗ -2.401∗∗∗ -3.294∗∗ -3.228∗∗∗
(0.432) (0.431) (0.420) (0.419)
TP Legislation Binary × Corp. Tax Rate 1.673∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.358)
TP Legislation Binary -0.466∗∗∗ -0.188
(0.125) (0.122)
Category 2 x Corp. Tax Rate 1.689∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗
(0.373) (0.363)
Category 3 x Corp. Tax Rate 1.837∗∗∗ 1.408∗∗∗
(0.417) (0.404)
Category 2 -0.459∗∗∗ -0.173
(0.126) (0.122)
Category 3 -0.528∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗
(0.142) (0.138)
APA x Corp. Tax Rate 0.387∗∗ 0.231 0.020 -0.264
(0.175) (0.231) (0.167) (0.220)
APA -0.213∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.118∗∗ 0.016
(0.050) (0.073) (0.048) (0.070)
Corp. Tax Rate x Time 0.037 0.031 0.307∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038)
Firm and Country Controls
√ √ √ √
Industry-Year-Effects
√ √ √ √
#Observations 146,321 146,321 146,321 146,321
Within R-Squared 0.1575 0.1575 0.0350 0.0351
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observational unit is the multinational affiliate per year. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the affiliate’s EBIT (Columns (1) and (2)) and EBIT over total assets (Columns (3)
and (4). See the notes to Tables 4 and 5 for a definition of the regressors. Furthermore, ’APA’ is a dummy variable
indicating whether an affiliate’s host country offers the possibility to enter into bilateral advance pricing agreements.
’APA x Corporate Tax Rate’ depicts the interaction term of this variable with the corporate tax rate.
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Table 8: Profit Shifting Incentives and the Corporate Tax Rate Differential
Dependent Variable: Log EBIT (Columns (1)-(3)), Log EBIT/Total Assets (Columns (4)-(6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax Differential -1.427∗∗∗ -1.436∗∗∗ -1.479∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗∗ -1.037∗∗∗ -1.031∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.367) (0.382) (0.338) (0.343) (0.363)
TP Leg. Binary × Tax Differential 1.054∗∗∗ 0.667∗
(0.385) (0.359)
TP Leg. Binary 0.105∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031)
Category 2 x Tax Differential 1.079∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗∗ 0.615 0.615
(0.410) (0.423) (0.387) (0.402)
Category 3 x Tax Differential 1.032∗∗ 1.256∗∗∗ 0.703∗ 0.782∗
(0.399) (0.431) (0.372) (0.405)
Category 2 0.102∗∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037)
Category 3 0.106∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.033)
APA x Tax Differential -0.116 -0.094
(0.239) (0.234)
APA -0.006 -0.032
(0.027) (0.026)
Tax Differential × Time 0.031 0.032 0.016 0.040 0.039 0.032
(0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032)
Firm and Country Controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year-Effects
√ √ √ √ √ √
Within R-Squared 0.1790 0.1790 0.1776 0.0370 0.0370 0.0367
#Obs 87,152 87,152 85,415 87,152 87,152 85,415
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observational unit is the multinational affiliate per year. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the EBIT (Columns (1)-(3)) and EBIT over total assets (Columns (4)-(6)). ’Tax
Differential’ depicts the difference between the host country’s statutory corporate tax rate (including local income
taxes and possible surcharges) and the unweighed average tax rate of all other group members. See the notes to the
previous tables for a definition of the other regressors.
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Table 9: Transfer Price Penalties
Dependent Variable: Log EBIT (Columns (1)), Log EBIT/Total Assets (Columns (2)-(5))
Tax Measure: Corporate Tax Rate (Columns (1)-(3)), Corporate Tax Rate Differential (Columns (4)-(5))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax Measure -10.64∗∗∗ -6.201∗∗∗ -5.542∗∗ -1.698∗∗ -1.597∗∗
(2.579) (2.329) (2.337) (0.695) (0.712)
Tax Measure × TP Leg. Binary 9.291∗∗∗ 3.848∗ 1.112∗
(2.551) (2.296) (0.666)
TP Legislation Binary -3.162∗∗∗ -1.185 0.136∗∗∗
(0.893) (0.804) (0.036)
Category 2 × Tax Measure 3.451 0.964
(2.300) (0.703)
Category 3 × Tax Measure 3.616 1.144∗
(2.300) (0.666)
Category 2 -1.014 0.148∗∗∗
(0.805) (0.040)
Category 3 -1.108 0.136∗∗∗
(0.805) (0.036)
Penalty × Tax Measure 0.567∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗ 0.519∗ 0.505∗
(0.206) (0.197) (0.210) (0.286) (0.287)
Penalty -0.140∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ 0.003 0.004
(0.055) (0.052) (0.056) (0.024) (0.024)
Tax Measure × Time 0.151∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.035 0.030
(0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034)
Firm and Country Controls
√ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year-Effects
√ √ √ √ √
Within R-Squared 0.1465 0.0338 0.0339 0.0351 0.0351
# Observations 138,758 138,758 138,758 81,015 81,015
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observational unit is the multinational affiliate per year. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the EBIT (Column (1)) and EBIT over total assets (Columns (2)-(5)). ’Tax Measure’
stands for the corporate tax rate in Specifications (1) to (3) and the unweighted average corporate tax rate difference
between the affiliate and other members in the same multinational group in Specifications (4) and (5). ’Penalty’
depicts a dummy variable indicating whether the affiliate’s host country levies special penalties related to transfer
pricing. See the notes to the previous tables for a definition of the other regressors.
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Table 10: CFC Legislations
Dependent Variable: Log EBIT (Columns (1)-(2)), Log EBIT/Total Assets (Columns (3)-(5))
Tax Measure: Corporate Tax Rate (Columns (1)-(3)), Corporate Tax Rate Differential (Columns (4)-(5))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax Measure -3.206∗∗∗ -2.778∗∗∗ -3.336∗∗∗ -1.098∗∗∗ -1.075∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.420) (0.409) (0.343) (0.348)
TP Legislation Binary 1.691∗∗∗ 0.619∗
× Tax Measure (0.362) (0.359)
TP Legislation Binary -0.454∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.031)
Category2 × Corporate Tax Rate 1.786∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗ 0.564
(0.366) (0.357) (0.387)
Category 3 × Corporate Tax Rate 2.439∗∗∗ 1.810∗∗∗ 0.663∗
(0.396) (0.384) (0.373)
Category 2 -0.467∗∗∗ -0.215∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.121) (0.036)
Category 3 -0.713∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.131) (0.031)
CFC × Tax Measure -0.195 -0.138 -0.149 0.345∗ 0.338∗
(0.156) (0.156) (0.150) (0.188) (0.189)
CFC 0.085∗ 0.066 0.082∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.016) (0.017)
Time × Tax Measure 0.172∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.030 0.028
(0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.029) (0.030)
# Observations 150,214 150,214 150,214 87,152 87,152
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observational unit is the multinational firm per year. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the EBIT (Column (1)) and EBIT over total assets (Columns (2)-(5)). ’Tax Measure’
stands for the corporate tax rate in Specifications (1) to (3) and the unweighted average corporate tax rate difference
between the affiliate and other members in the same multinational group in Specifications (4) and (5). See the notes
to Tables 4 and 5 for a definition of the regressors. Additionally, CFC indicates whether the affiliate is affected by
controlled foreign company rules. The variable is coded 1 if the considered firm is the parent of a multinational
group (or a subsidiary located in the parent country) and CFC legislations are enacted in its home country or if the
considered firm is a subsidiary of a multinational group whose parent country has enacted CFC legislations which
are binding with respect to the subsidiary’s host country (i.e. the subsidiary’s host country is considered to be a
tax haven by the home country’s CFC legislations).
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